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Academics have often been criticised for their preoccupation with theoretical 
abstraction and logical deduction and • their concomitant failure to address 
issues of practical importance or exigency. It must therefore be stated at the 
outset that the recommendations contained in this paper are not confined to 
a theoretical analysis of the doctrine of mistake. Per contrast, they are 
motivated by a genuine concern on the part of the writer to alleviate the 
present discord between South African criminal legal theory and socio-cultural 
reality. These recommendations are premised upon the advantages of the 
reception of the normative approach to criminal liability in South Africa, and 
they have been iterated elsewhere l by the writer in the context of, inter alia, 
the defence of necessity. 
The submissions that constitute the core of this paper must, however, be 
regarded as subject to the following qualification. A successful reception of 
the normative approach necessitates a change in the existing power relations 
that are operative in South African courts. To leave its application to the 
presiding judge and assessors would be to give them the freedom to inflect 
their decisions with their personal values and prejudices. It has been argued 
elsewhere2 by the writer that this problem may possibly be solved by the re-
introduction of the jury system, suitably loaded to cater for the interests 
operative in the case. Sustained reflection and exposure to the exigencies of 
practice has, however, yielded the conclusion that the difficulties that 
accompanied the jury system and the suspicion with which it was viewed, 
outweigh any advantages t,hat its re-introduction may have. A possible 
alternative, and one which, it is submitted, would work well in practice, is the 
increased use of expert witnesses at the stage prior to conviction, provided 
that they are suitably qualified (either formally or informally) to adduce 
2 
evidence on the socio-cultural matrix of relations in which the accused in 
question lives and moves. 
In the context of mistake of law, for example, evidence concerning, inter 
alia, the level of legal knowledge and general education in a particular 
community could be adduced by persons who are either long-standing 
members or active participants in the socio-cultural life. of such community. 
The theoretical views and preferences expressed in this paper should thus be 
read with the above-mentioned practico-social problems in mind. 
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A. INTRODUCTION 
The intrinsic nature of the concept of mistake problematises its relation 
to the general principles of criminal liability. The essence of the 
problem may best be illustrated by distinguishing bet\Neen the notion of 
mistake and the notion of accident. For Fletcher, the difference 
bet\Neen accident and mistake resides in the fact that whereas the 
former occurs in the realm of causation, the latter occurs in the realm 
of perception. While the results of blind causal processes are universally 
regarded as non-culpable, misperceptions are not.3 The question is 
thus to what extent individual misperceptions ought to be allowed to 
supercede the dictates of the law. It will be argued in what follows 
that any answer to this question, however theoretically sound, 
inevitably involves considerations of legal policy and hence results in 
the inflection of the law with a particular value judgment. 
The comparative analysis that constitutes the core of this paper will be 
prefaced by a discussion of the theoretical models, viz the 
psychological and normative theories of criminal liability, that inform the 
position accorded the doctrine of mistake in the various jurisdictions 
under review. It will be argued that the normative theory of criminal 
liability is both theoretically and practically superior to its nineteenth 
century counterpart, and that its reception in South Africa may solve 
some of the problems that beset a society in a state of flux. 
It will become apparent from the comparative survey that informs the 
perspective adopted in this paper that whereas German law has 
adopted an approach that . demands that citizens be more 
circumspect in relation to the provisions of the law than to the factual 
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situation in which they find themselves, South African law has, by 
adopting an entirely subjective approach to error iuris and error facti, 
implicitly entrenched a policy which unduly favours the wrongdoer. It 
will be seen further that .the firm entrenchment of the maxim ignorantia 
iuris non excusat in English 1aw, albeit viable in most practical instances, 
has rendered this jurisdiction unjust, inflexible and uncertain in relation 
to the solution of penumbra! cases. It will be argued that the German 
approach, albeit suitably modified. is preferable and could profitably 
be implemented in South Africa. The advantages of its reception will 
be illustrated with reference to the problem of police abuse of power 
and to the issue of reliance on erroneous legal advice. 
B. 
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DOCTRINE OF MISTAKE: VORS.?\TZTEORIE V SCHULDTEORIE 
The theoretical space accorded the doctrine of mistake in the various 
jurisdictions under review can best be illustrated by reference to the 
theories of criminal liability that underpin them. The psychological 
theory of criminal liability (also known as the Vorsatzteorie or. th~ theory 
of intent) is predicated upon the so-called causal theory of an act; 
which is defined as follows by Snyman: "The causal theory of an 
act ... regards the acf only from the outside, that is without any 
reference to the state of mind of the person committing the act...mhe 
act is any voluntary human conduct whereby some change, 
perceivable by the senses, is brought about in the outside world by 
means of the mechanical laws of cause and effect ... 4 
The fact that the proponents of this theory regard the human act as 
devoid of intention or will leads them to make a strict distinction 
between the actus reus and the mens rea of criminal conduct. 
Whereas the former contains all th~. objective elements, the latter 
contains all the subjective elements of criminal liability. Since a mistake 
constitutes a subjective misperception on the part of the actor, it is 
necessarily confined to the inquiry into mens rea. Furthermore, since 
intention is defined as do/us ma/us Ca guilty state of mind), knowledge 
of unlawfulness forms an integral part of intention. Proponents of this 
approach thus contend "that knowledge of the factual components of 
a crime and knowledge of the legal prohibition as such are equal 
elements within the concepts of intent or negligence. Without 
knowledge of the legal prohibition there is no consciousness of 
wrongdoing (Unrechtsbewusstsein). Error iuris, as well as mistake of fact, 
precludes criminal intent.. ... 5 Since the approach to criminal intent is 
) . 
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entirely subjective, any error, whether of fact or of law, and whether 
reasonable or unreasonable, negates intent and hence excludes 
criminal liability. Proponents of this approach thus deny the relevance 
of external factors t0at may influence the behaviour of the actor. 
Furthermore, they argue that since law is a positive science, obedience 
to the dictates of pure theory excludes the possibility of the inflection of 
the law with normative considerations or value judgments. It will be 
seen in the comparative suNey that follows that whereas South African 
law adheres to the Vorsatzteorie in its pure form, English law adopts it 
only insofar as mistake of fact is concerned. In relation to mistake of 
law, English lmv hes retained the antiquated maxim ignorantia iuris non 
excusat. It will be argued that South African law has, by adopting a 
purely psychological approach, inflected the law with a value 
judgment that favours the individual over the social collectivity. Per 
contrast, the entrenchment of the ignorantia rule in English law reveals 
the utilitarian assumptions that underpin the English legal system .. 
The normative theory of criminal liability (also known as the Schuldteorie 
or theory of culpability) is premised upon a general system of analysis, 
the core concepts of which are the following: • .. .Tatbestandsmassigkeit 
(viz) the state or condition of fulfilling the defined elements of a criminal 
offense, Re:;htswidrigkeit (wrongfulness), and Schuld (culpability)."6 This 
system of analysis is not embodied in the positive law but rather exists in 
abstracto in the theoretical framework of German criminal law. It exists 
in a relation of superiority over the laws of the land and "requires that all 
positive· legislation conform to it."7 Apart from the fact that its 
theoretical precision facilitates the existence of order, certainty and 
impartiality in the application of the law, ·this system of analysis also 
entrenches certain basic values that operote as guarantees for the 
:..-_____; 
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achievement of justice in a particular case. "The category of violation 
of the definition seeks to insure that the criminal justice system does not 
impose criminal liability without first establishing that a precise statutory 
rule has been broken by the perpetrator. The category of wrongfulness 
seeks to insure that general justificatory exceptions (both statutory and 
extra-statutory) militating against liability are sought, clarified, and 
considered in every case. The category of culpability seeks to insure 
that punishment does not follow on the mere showing that, objectively 
viewed, a rule has been violated without justification. It forces 
attention to the person of the perpetrator and requires special 
attention to the excuses he (sic) offers for his (sic) conduct. •8 
Naucke has argued that the German system of analysis evolved as a 
result of a particular, nationally-specific political experience viz the Third 
Reich, the excesses of which seNed to highlight the need to ensure 
that "(d)eviation from the accepted norms of society should not be 
responded to with uncontrolled violence. The first reaction, rather, 
should be to try to gain distance from the deviant event. This distance 
is attained by binding oneself to a definite and formal pattern of 
analysis."9 
He argues further that despite its historically specific origins: ... the values 
implicit in the general system for analyzing criminal acts have a natural 
lawlike character that transcends national boundaries.• l O It is 
submitted that although Naucke correctly commends the systems 
analysis for its prescriptive relation. to positive law, and although he 
rightly regards it as of useful application to other nations, he errs in 
attributing a 'natural lawlike' nature to the values it embodies. To 
argue this is to assume, albeit implicitly, that these values are static and 
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unchanging across time and space. Per contrast, the changes that 
have occurred in German legal theory in the past century illustrate that 
these values are not fixed but change in accordance with changes in 
socio-political and economic reality. Legal theory must necessarily be 
dynamic in order to force the positive law to adapt to and reflect 
contemporary values. It must also take account of the existence of 
competing values which have arisen as a result ··of heterogeneous 
population groups and diverse societal strata. As has been argued by 
Arzt in relation to the German concept of'mistake of law, "(i)ncreasing 
stratification in society and loss of a common sense of social values 
make credib!e mistakes of law more likely, and tolerance by the law 
· more necessary then ever.• l 1 It will be· argued in what follows that the 
stringency of the test adopted by German law for an exculpatory 
mistake of law illustrates the above-mentioned point. The high 
standard of conscientiousness required from the average citizen in 
relation to the laws of the land obscures the fact that knowledge of 
these laws is often unattainable or that many laws embody values 
which are in conflict . with those adhered to by certain strata in a 
heterogeneous society. 
It should be apparent from the foregoing that the normative theory of 
criminal liability mc:<es specific provision for the existence of value-
judgments in the application of the law. The theory is predicated upon 
an acceptance of the fina!istic theory of an act. The proponents of the 
finalistic theory aver that "(tlhe backbone of the act is ·the human will, 
because the idea of finality is derived from the ability of the human will 
to select a goal in advance, and to direct his (sic) conduct towards 
achieving this goal." 12 -- "The directing of his (sic) will upon a certain 
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goal by the actor, is nothing else than his (sic) intention. (ie) ... the 
intention of the actor forms part of the octus reus." 13 
As soon as it is accepted that the inquiry into the octus reus constitutes 
an admixture of objective and subjective elements, it becomes clear 
that a strict separation between subjectivity and objectivity is 
theoretically unsound. Furthermore, the inquiry into mens reo is also a 
blend of the objective and the subjective. No longer is one 
concerned to discover the inner state of mind of the accused; per 
contrast, the inquiry into culpability. constitutes a reproach: can the 
actor fairly be blamed· for what s/he did? 
Acceptance of the Schu/dteorie "leads to a distinction in treatment of 
error iuris and mistake of fact.• 14 Since intent forms an integral part of 
the human act an error relating to the definition of the proscription 
(Tatbestandsirrtum) negates intent and thus excludes criminal liability. 
Since the existence of a legal provision is not a causal factor that is 
subject to the determination of the human will, • ... the ability of the 
human will to 'overdetermine' the causal process by intentionally 
selecting causal factors becomes separated from knowledge of the 
law. As a result, knowledge of the legal prohibition is expelled from the 
concept of intent as well as from the concept of negligence . 
... Knowledge of the law and culpable lack of legal knowledge become 
separate elements within the concept of guilt, whereas intent and 
negligence become separate elements of the octus reus (Tatbestand). 
This theory sees error iuris as a problem not of intent but of guilt. This 
makes it possible to distinguish between errors concerning elements 
within the sphere of actus reus (Tatbestond), including intent, and errors 
affecting consciousness of wrongdoing, which are within the sphere of 
10 
guilt." 15 Whereas a Tatbestandsirrtum excludes intent whether it is 
reasonable or unreasonable, a Verbotsirrtum excludes criminal liability 
only if the actor cannot f air,y be blamed for making the error. The test 
developed by the German theorists in this regard is known as the 
Unvermeidbarkeitsdoktrin. The actor is excused if s/he could not have 
avoided the error; if, however, the error was avoidable with the 
exercise of due conscientiousness, the actor is not excused but his/her 
punishment may be mitigated. As has been argued by Snyman, "(t)he 
normative theory of culpability leads one to the view that ignorance of 
the law ought not invariably to be regarded as a defence. If the 
ignorance was avoidable Oi unreasonable or if X should have been 
aware of the relevant legal rule, there are grounds upon which he (sic) 
can be blamed. This is the reason why according to this theory actual 
knowledge that the act is forbidden by law is not required.•16 
Arzt has argued that "(t)he primary achievement of the Schuldtheorie 
lies precisely in its theoretical justification for treating error iuris as a 
weaker defense than mistake .. of fact. The key here is understanding 
the function of intent as defined by this theory: intent is purged by 
considering consciousness of wrongdoing an element of guilt, not of 
intent. Intent seNes cs a warning to the perpetrator that: his (sic) 
intended act rnight be unlawful. ( Wamfunktion des 
Tatbestondsvorsatzes) In contrast to mistake of fact, which excludes 
intent, in mistake of law the defendant has a specific reason for 
checking carefully what he (sic) is about to do, namely his (sic) 
knowledge that he (sic) is about to harm the life, property,; or freedom 
. . 
of another being, actions which generally are prohibited." 17 
11 
The Schu/dteorie in its pure form, as outlined above, has not found 
application in modern German law since the rigour of its theoretical 
precision has caused injustice in penumbra! cases. Instead, a more 
lenient form, the Eingeschrankte Schuldteorie, has emerged as a 
practical compromise. The differences between the two theories will 
be illustrated in section D.2. infra. 
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C. SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
1. THE ROMAN-DUTCH TRADITION 
It appears from a suNey of the old authorities that there is a 
marked affinity between the Roman-Dutch common law and the 
modern German approach to mistake of law. Snyman -provides 
the following summary of the views of the major Roman-Dutch 
jurists: • Although the common-law authorities are not in 
complete agreement on the subject, the overall impression one 
gets from a reading of their opinions is that ignorance of the law 
did constitute a defence, provided it was unavoidable. Thus 
Grotius, Zoesius and Merula acknowledge ignorance of the law 
as a defence, provided it is unavoidable .... Voet states that 
ignorance of the law excuses ... any person in respect of a crime 
requiring do/us, but immediately afterwards he contradicts himself 
by saying that those who are ignorant of the law usually merely 
receive a lighter punishment, since they are not free of 
negligence ... ln my opinion, Voet's views must be interpreted as 
follows: ignorance of the law is only an excuse if it is not due to 
negligence.• 18 
13 
2. THE PRE-DE BLOM ERA 
Prior to the watershed decision in De Blom. South African law 
adhered to a strict distinction between mistake of fact and 
mistake of law. As far as the former was concerned. it was held 
in,R v Mbombela 1933 AD 269 at 272 that "(mlistake of fact, in 
order to be a defence in criminal law, must not only be a bona 
fide belief, but must also be a reasonable belief." Per contrast, 
the maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse precluded the 
existence, in principle, of a defence of mistake of law. This 
maxim received approval by the Appellate Division in Werner in a 
case of murder.19 The courts did, however, unconsciously 
excuse a mistake of law ·wear die beskuldigde onder 'n 
sogenaamde 'claim of right' opgetree het. selfs al het die 
onkunde indirek voortgespruit uit onkunde aangaande die 
bepalings van ·n wet."20 
In essence. therefore, the position in South African law prior to De 
Blom accorded with the current English approach to mistake. 
The only notable difference was that a mistake of fact had to be 
reasonable in order to exculpate. a rule which has in any event 
recently been gaining ground in English law. 
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3. DE BLOM AND AFTER 
In S v De Blom 1977 (3) SA 513 (A) (the locus c/assicus on mistake 
of law) the accused was charged with a contravention of the 
Exchange Control regulations because she had taken money 
and jewelry out of the country without the requisite perrriission. It 
was contended on her behalf that she had. at the relevant time, 
been unaware of the provisions embodied in the regulations. The 
court. per Rumptt CJ, was of the view that "(i)n hierdie stadium 
van ons regsontwikkeling moet dit aanvaar word dat die cliche 
dot · every person is presumed to know the law· geen grond vir 
bestaan het nie en dot die opvatting 'ignorance of the law is no 
excuse· regtens nie van toepassing kan wees nie in die lig van 
die hedendaagse skuldbegrip in ons reg ... "(529H) Having thus 
rejected the· maxim.· the learned judge formulated the law 
applicable to a defence of ignorance of the law as follows: 
"In ·n soak soos die onderhawige moet aanvaar word dat 
wanneer die Stoat getuienis voorgele het dat die verbode 
handeling begcan ls, ·n afleiding gedoen kan word, na 
gelang van die cmstondighede, dot die beskuldigde 
willens en wetens (dws ook met onregmatigheidsbewussyn) 
die handeling begaan het. lndien die beskuldigde op 'n 
verweer wil steun ... dot sy nie geweet het · dot hoar 
handeling onregmatig was nie. kan hoar verweer slaag 
indien van die getuienis as geheel afgelei. kan word dot 
door ·n redelike moontlikheid bestaan dot sy nie geweet 
het dot hoar handeling onregmatig was nie; en verder. 
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wanneer slegs culpa en nie do/us alleen as mens reo vereis 
word nie, daar ook 'n redelike moontlikheid bestaan dat sy 
nie juridies geblameer kan word nie, dws dat wat al die -
omstandighede betref, dit redelik moontlik is dat sy met 
die nodige omsigtigheid te werk gegaan het om hoar op 
hoogte te stel van wat van hoar verwag word in verband 
.. met die vraag of toestemming om geld uit te neem nodig 
is of nie. Sou daar op die getuienis as geheel. dws 
insluitende die getuienis dat die handeling gepleeg is,' 'n 
redelike twyfel bestaan of daar wel mens reo ... by die 
beskuldigde best a an het, sou die Stoat sy (sic) soak nie 
sonder redelike twyfel bewys het nie."(532E-HJ 
The decision in Oe Blom is thus authority for the view that bona 
tide ignorance or mistake of law, whether or not it is reasonable, 
· negates intention and hence exculpates in the case of offences 
requiring intention. In crimes of negligence the mistake must be 
reasonable in order to exculpate. It remained uncertain, 
however, whether the ambit of the judgment extended to 
mistakes of fact. 
The approach to mistake of fact was clarified a few years later in 
S v Sam 1980 ( 4) SA 289 (T). The court referred to Mbombe/a and 
held that it had been superceded by the decision in Oe Blom. 
The learned judge proffered the following exposition of the 
current approach to the issue of mistake: 
"In S v De B/om ... het die Appelafdeling baie onsekerhede 
uit die weg geruim. In daardie soak het dit gegaan oor 
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error iuris, maar is na my oordeel ook gesag daaNoor dot 
daar, by die beoordeling van wederregtelikheids-
bewussyn, geen verskil tussen error iuris en error facti getref 
behoort te word nie. .. .Op gesag van die genoemde 
gewysdes is dit na my oordeel so dot by 'n misdaad waar 
opset (do/us) 'n vereiste is moet die Stoat bo redelike 
twyfel wederregtelikheidsbewussyn bewys. Of die 
feitedwaling redelik of onredelik is, is nie ter sake nie omdat 
die toets subjektief is. Die begrip van redelikheid of 
onredelikheid, en die graad daaNan in die 
omstandighede en feite van elke soak, kom alleen ter 
sprake by die bewyslewering of die beskuldigde wel bona 
fide gedwaal het al den nie. Dit raak nie die regsbeginsel 
as sodanig nie. Dit ge!d in beide gemeenregtelike en 
statutere misdrywe wear do/us 'n vereiste is."(294C-E) 
Visser and Vorster have argued that "(t)he cumulative effect of 
(De Blom and Sam) is to confirm that the crucial question is not 
whether the accused's mistake was one of fact or law, but 
whether the accused lacked knowledge of unlawfulness as a 
result of his (sic) mistake. ■21 
The concept of knowledge cf unlawfulness was subjected to 
judicial scrutiny in S v Magidson 1984 (3) SA 825 m. Having 
referred with approval to the views of De Wet and Swanepoel in 
this regard, the Court delineated the concept as follows: 
"Do/us ... also requires knowledge of the unlawfulness of the 
act. ...Such actual knowledge, however, may also be by 
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way of do/us eventualis. It is also not necessary that the 
accused must be aware that he (sic) is contravening a 
specific section of a specific Act. It is sufficient if he (sic) 
knows that what he (sic) is doing is unlawful. Nor does the 
accused have to be certain that what he (sic) is doing is 
unlawful. It is sufficient if he (sic) realises that what he (sic) 
is doing may possibly be unlawful and reconciles himself 
(sic) with this possibility."(830A-C) 
Knowledge of unlawfulness is therefore an essential element of 
criminal liability in South African law. The fact that the accused 
ought reasonably to have had the requisite knowledge is 
insufficient for the imposition of liability in crimes requiring 
intention, although it suffices in the case of crimes requiring 
negligence. 
It should be apparent from the foregoing that the South African 
law of mistake constitutes an exact reflection of the 
· psychological theory of criminal liability discussed supra. This 
slavish devotion to a theory which has been abandoned in its 
country of origin (viz nineteenth-century Germany) has resulted in 
the implicit adoption of a value-judgment that unduly favours 
the wrongdoer and hence emphasises individual liberty at the 
expense of social responsibility. It has also led to a number of 
judicial decisions which are either theoretically unsound or 
procedurally problematic in instances where the logical 
application of the law would cause manifest injustice. (This point 
will receive further elaboration in the discussion in section G infra.) 
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4. ACADEMIC VIEWS AND NEIGHBOURING JURISDICTIONS 
A suNey of academic opinion concerning the approach that 
ought to be adopted in relation to the issue of mistake yields the 
conclusion that the jurists are_ fairly evenly divided. On the one 
hand. theorists such as Snyman, Van der Merwe and Stassen are 
firm supporters of the normative approach to the problem. 
Stassen' s view constitutes a cogent exposition of the normative 
standpoint. He argues that it is highly probable that the courts 
will in many instances be unable to determine beyond 
reasonable doubt whether or not the accused acted with 
knowledge of unlawfulness. He remarks further that "(d)ie 
resulterende ondergrawing van c:ie effektiwiteit van strafbepalings 
sou egter so onaanvaarbaar wees dot dit die moontlikheid dot 
'n nalatigheidstoets onder die dekmantel van 'n streng 
subjektiewe opsetstoets toegepas word, kan loot ontstaan . 
. . . Sou dit don nie bet er wees om die kind by die naam te noem 
en te erken dot hierdie aspek van 'n beskuldigde se strafregtelike 
aanspreeklikheid aan die hand van objektiewe maatstawwe 
beoordeel moet word nie? Dit is interessant om daarop te let 
dot die Duitse ·strafreg alreeds hierdie gevolgtrekking bereik 
het."22 
Whiting, although not an explicit proponent of the normative 
approach, takes the view that only a reasonable mistake of law 
should exculpate. He substantiates his view by adverting to the 
fact that many offences can only be committed intentionally. 
Were an accused therefore to escape liability on account of an 
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unreasonable mistake of law s/he could not be held liable for 
acting negligently, He therefore concludes that the approach 
adopted in De Blom " ... will operate entirely to remove from the 
field of criminality conduct which it is suggested ought still to be 
regarded as criminal."23 
Per contrast, jurists such as De Wet and Swanepoel, Visser and 
Vorster, Van Rooyen and Robie commend the decision in De 
Blom. Although Visser and Vorster concede that "(i)n view of the 
difficulty in disproving allegations of mistake of law ... the principles 
expounded in De Blom do unduly favour the wrongdoer," and 
that "the only options available in this regard are a shifting of the 
onus to the accused or accepting that intention is excluded only 
if the mistake of law is unavoidable,· they take the view that 
• ... a shifting of the onus is preferable from a theoretical 
perspective. 11 24 
Robie argues that "(tlhe terms ignorance or mistake of law (and 
of fact are) ... misleading ... because (they) ... seek to focus on the 
nature of the ignorance or mistake, rather than on its effect." He 
thus advocates the abolition of the distinction between mistake 
of fact and mistake of law and urges that it be replaced with the 
German distinction between Tatbestandsirrtum and Verbotsirrtum. 
He retains his allegiance to the psychological theory, however, 
by taking the view that both Tatbestandsirrtumer and 
Verbotsirrtumer should operate to negate intent.25 
It is interesting to note that • ... the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe 
declined to follow the De Blom case in S v Appleton 1982 (4) SA 
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829 (ZS) at 831 A where Fieldsend CJ expressed the view that the 
South African Appellate Division had given insufficient 
consideration to the far-reaching effects of its decision. •26 The 
High Court of Namibia has, however, accepted the present 
South African approach. In S v Maseka 1991 (2) SACR 509 (Nm) 
O'Linn J, albeit critical of certain aspects of the De Blom 
decision, nevertheless held that it reflects the current position in 
Namibian law. The relevant excerpt from the judgment reads as 
follows: 
"It seems to me that the most telling point of criticism is 
that in most cases where mens reo in the form of do/us is 
required and the onus is on the State, it may in many 
cases be virtually impossible for the State to discharge the 
onus beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused knew 
what the law required of him (sic). It may be that the 
Namibian Courts will in future reconsider the issue. 
However, it seems to me trict S v De Blom at present 
correctly sets out Namibian law."(5 l 2a-b) 
It is submitted that the foregoing survey highiights the fact that 
there is widespread academic support for the implementation of 
the normative theory in South Africa, as well as considerable . 
concern about the far-reaching consequences of the De Blom 
decision. Furthermore, as is evident from the above-quoted · 
dicta, the attitude of the judiciary in neighbouring jurisdictiof)s to 
the De Blom decision is either one of outright rejection or • of 
cautious acceptance. 
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D. GERMAN LAW 
1. KNOWLEDGE OF UNLAWFULNESS 
It is apposite to commence the discussion of the German law of 
mistake by engaging in a brief analysis of the nature and content 
of the German concept of Unrechtsbewusstsein (knowledge of 
unlawfulness). As was mentioned supra. the concept forms part. 
not of intent, but of the element of culpability. The components 
of the latter are described as follows by Snyman: 
• ... Eerstens word die toerekeningsvatbaarheidsvereiste 
beskou as deel van die skuldvereiste. 
wederregteliksbewussyn, wat kennis 
verbodsbeskrywing as van die 
. .. Tweedens vorm 
van sowel die 
afwesigheid van 
regverdigingsgronde insluit, deel van skuld en wel by 
misdade wot opsetlik gepleegde handelings bestraf . 
... Derdens vorm die besluit van die dader om die 
handeling te verrig (handelingswil of kleurlose opset) deel 
van skuld .. .Dit is 'n kenmerk van die moderne skuldbegrip 
dot opset 'n dubbele rol speel in die misdaadkonstruksie 
deurdat dit deel vorm van sowel onreg (en meer bepaald 
die verbodsbeskrywing) as van skuld. . .. Ten slotte word vir 
skuld die afwesigheid van versontskuldigingsgronde (' dos 
Fehlen · von Entschuldigungsgrunden') vereis. ...(D)ie 
uitdrukking 'afvlesigheid van verontskuldigingsgronde' (is) 
maar net 'n ander ... manier ... waarop uitdrukking gegee 
word aan die gedagte dot die dader slegs vir sy (sic) 
wederregtelike gedrag verwyt kan word indien 'n mens in 
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die omstandighede redelikerwys van horn (sic) kon vervvog 
het om regmatig op te tree ('Zumutbarkeit')."27 
The concept of knowledge of unlawfulness thus constitutes an 
element of culpability that is distinct from the Zumutbarkeitsdoktrin 
(the doctrine of reasonable expectability). It is therefore 
theoretically unsound to regard instances of exculpatory mistake 
of law as excuses in the German sense of the term, as so many 
commentators on German law seem to do. Per contrast, a 
definite distinction exists in German law between 
Schuldousschliessungsgrunde (grounds excluding culpability) and 
Entschuldigungsgrunde (grounds of excuse). Jescheck explains 
the former as follows: "Schuldfahigke!t und Bewusstsein der 
Rechtswidrigkeit sind schu/dbegrundende merkmole. 1st der Tater 
nicht schuldfahig oder handelt er in unvermeidbarem 
Verbotsirrtum, so fehlt es an der Schuld. ■28 The legal effect of an 
error of law is assessed in accordance with the 
Unvermeidborkeitsdoktrin rather than the Zumutborkeitsdoktrin. 
Whereas the former is governed by the criterion of unavoidability, 
the latter encompasses the standard of reasonable expectability. 
As will become apparent in what follows, the former standard 
embodies a more stringent test than the letter. In effect, the 
issue of whether or not a mistake of law exculpates is dealt with 
solely by reference to the element of knowledge of unlawfulness 
while the fourth component of culpability does not come into 
play. (This issue will be discussed more comprehensively in 
section D.4. infra.) 
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The content of the German concept of knowledge of 
unlawfulness differs somewhat from its South African counterpart. 
Botha provides a cogent exposition of the former: "Kennis van 
alleen die onsedelikheid of immoraliteit van die daad is nie 
voldoende nie. Moor aangesien die meeste van die norme van 
die Strafgesetzbuch ook sedelik afkeurenswaardig is. is door 
noodwendig 'n groot mate van ooNleueling. Nie kennis van 
wederregtelikheid in regstegniese sin word verlang nie, moor wel 
kennis in leke sin, ... dit wil se. 'n nie-juridiese waardebepaling 
deur die leek (nie-juris) in sy (sic) steer van sosiale denke en 
optrede." He states further that "(w)aar dieselfde handeling meer 
as een na-verwante misdryf kan uitmaak. moet die 
wederregtelikheidsbewussyn van die dader die besondere misdryf 
wot horn (sic) ten laste gele word, omvat. 11 29 Arzt utilizes the 
offence of incest to illustrate the latter characteristic: "A 
daughter-in-law has intercourse with her father-in-law knowing 
that she is committing adultery and that her actions are legally 
and morally wrong, but not knowing that the act is included in 
the definition of incest. The daughter-in-law's knowledge has 
been held to be insufficient knowledge of the specific wrong 
inherent in incest."30 
Botha adverts to a further characteristic of the concept of 
knowledge of unlawfulness (which, incidentally, is shared by its 
South African counterpart). 'Die dader hoef nie · van die 
wederregtelikheid van sy (sic) voorgenome optrede oortuig te 
wees nie. Ook as hy (sic) meen dot dit moontlik wederregtelik 
kan wees, moor hy (sic) besluit om nogtans daarmee voort te 
goon. handel hy (sic) met wederregtelikheidsbewussyn."31 
24 
It should be apparent from the foregoing analysis that the 
German concept of knowledge of unlawfulness functions as a 
foundation for the reproach inherent in the concept of 
culpability. It will be seen more clearly in what follows that the 
application of the Unvermeidbarkeitsdoktrin at this stage of the 
analysis may result in the imposition of criminal liability in instances 
where the actor does not have actual knowledge of 
unlawfulness since the lack of such knowledge is regarded as 
culpable in the circumstances of the case. 
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2. THE EINGESCHR~NKTE SCHULDTEORIE 
An Gdequate understanding of the difference between the 
Schu/dteorie and its eingeschr6nkte counterpart necessitates a 
brief excursus on the incremental acceptance and modification 
of German legal theory by the courts. 
The Vors6tzteorie, which had hitherto been espoused by the 
Reichsgericht, received its death-knell in 1952 in a decision by 
the Bundesgerichtshof. The facts were as follows: The accused, 
an attorney, had undertaken to appear on behalf of an 
accused without reaching a prior agreement about fees. After 
his first appearance he threatened to cease defending her unless 
she paid him 50 Deutschmark immediately. When she complied 
' 
he forced her by means of a similar threat to sign an 
acknowledgment of debt for a further 400 Deutschmark. 32 
In the course of its consideration of the accused's defence of 
ignorance of the law, the court held that not all instances of 
error iuris ought to exculpate. Botha provides a cogent summary 
of the ratio: 
"Onkunde (gebrek aan kennis) is binne perke beheerbaar. 
Aangesien die mens oor 'n vrye, sedelike selfbestemming 
beskik, word dit ten alle tye van horn (sic) verwag dot hy 
(sic), as deelhebber aan die regsgemeenskap, horn (sic) 
regmatig moet gedra en onreg moet vermy. Vir die 
nakoming van hierdie plig is dit nie voldoende as hy (sic) 
net dit vermy wot hy (sic) duidelik kan sien verkeerd is nie: 
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sy (sic) plig goon verder. Hy (sic) moet seker maak dot 
alles wot hy (sic) beoog binne die perke van die wet is. 
Waar hy (sic) twyfel moet hy (sic) deur nadenke of deur 
die nodige inligting te bekom, homself (sic) tevrede stel. 
HieNoor is nodig gewetensinspanning no 'n maatstaf 
voorgeskryf deur die omstandighede en die lewens-en 
beroepskring van die individu. As hy (sic) ten spyte van 
die vereiste gewetensinspanning nie die onregmatigheid 
van sy (sic) optrede kon insien nie, is sy (sic) dwaling 
onoorwinlik en sy (sic) daad vir horn (sic) nie vermybaar 
nie. In so 'n geval kan hy (sic) nie van skuld verwyt word 
nie. Waar hy (sic) wel met behoorlike gewetensinspanning 
die onregmatigheid van sy (sic) daad kon herken het, lei 
sy (sic) verbodsdwaling nie tot die uitsluiting van skuld nie. 
Na gelang van die mate waarin hy (sic) versuim het om 
deur die nodige gewetensinspanning die onregmatigheid 
van sy (sic) optrede te herken, kan die skuldverwyt 
verminder word."33 
Having thus delineated the principles applicable to 
Verbotsirrtumer, the Bundesgerichtshof held that the accused 
could, with the exercise of due conscientiousness, have avoided 
the perpetration of the error. It thus convicted the accused and 
ruled that his sentence be mitigated in accordance . with the 
provisions of s49( 1) of the Code. 
The entrenchment of the strenge Schuldteorie, as manifested in 
the above decision, was, however, short-lived. The emergence 
of a number of penumbra! cases in the period immediately 
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following upon its reception highlighted the unpalatable results 
that could in certain circumstances ensue from its application. 
The so-called Erlaubnistatbestandsirrtum (which is discussed in 
detail in Section D.3(b)(iii) infra) constitutes the prime example of 
the undesirable consequences of the strenge Schuldteorie. Being 
a species of Verbotsirrtum. it would. in terms of this theory, be 
subject to the - Unvermeidbarkeitsdoktrin and would thus only 
exculpate if unavoidable. However, since an Erlaubnistat-
bestandsirrtum comprises a factual error which results in an error 
of law, it was felt that such an approach was unjust when 
viewed from the perspective of the accused. Arzt pr~vides a 
cogent exposition of the intrinsic nature of this species of error 
and the judicial approach thereto: "Someone may mistakenly 
believe in the existence of a factual situation in which the law 
permits acts otherwise criminal - such as erroneously assuming 
the factual situation of an illegal attack - and injure or kill a 
person, allegedly in self-defense. Such a case involves a 
combination of intent to kill and error iuris based on mistake of 
fact. The Bundesgerichtshof did not follow the strict theory of 
guilt, but rather decided these cases according to the principles 
of the theory of intent."34 The inquiry into the (un)avoidability of 
an Erlaubnistatbestandsirrtum was thus eschewed and the 
existence of such an error operated ipso facto, as in instances of 
Tatbestandsirrtumer. to exclude intent. 
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This curtailment of the strenge Schu!dteorie became known as 
the eingeschrankte Schuldteorie and essentially constitutes an 
eschewal of the ideal of theoretical precision in the interests of 
justice in certain, strictly delineated circumstances. (Incidentally, 
the third species of error discussed in Section D.3(c) infra 
represents another example of the operation of the 
eingeschrankte Schuldteorie.) 
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3. CATEGORIES OF MISTAKE 
The multifarious categories of mistake that have emerged in 
German law are premised upon an acceptance of the 
eingeschrankte Schu/dteorie outlined supra. The analysis that 
follows will encompass an exposition of the definitions and legal 
consequences 6f each of these categories with reference to a 
number of practical examples. 
(a) T~TBESTANDSIRRTUM 
The concept of Tatbestandsirrtum (mistake concerning the 
definition of the proscription) is defined as follows by 
Jescheck: "Ein Tatbestandsirrtum liegt danach vor, wenn 
jemand 'bei Begehung der Tat einen Umstand nicht kennt, 
der zum gesetzlichen Tatbestand gehort'. Gemeint mit 
diesen 'Umstanden' zunachst alle objektiven Merkmale des 
gesetzlichen T atbestands. •35 S 16 of the Code provides 
that such an error excludes intent and thus negates 
criminal liability regardless of whether it is reasonable or 
unreasonable. A successful reliance on a Tatbestandsirrtum 
renders the conduct iri question lawful and hence justified. 
An actor errs in relation to the Tatbestand where, for 
example, s/he shoots • and kills a human being in the 
mistaken belief that s/he is shooting at a tree stump. Since 
the definition of murder requires an intent to kill a human 
being the actor lacks intent in respect of this element and 
hence is acquitted, regardless of whether his/her error was 
reasonable or unreasonable. 
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Not every error concerning the definition of the proscription 
is regarded as exculpatory in German law. A distinction is 
drawn between Subsumptionsirrtum (a legally irrelevant 
error) and Tatbestandsirrtum. Arzt explains the nature of 
the distinction as follows: • A lay concept which does not 
sufficiently·· parallel the legal definition leads to a 
(Tatbestandsirrtum), since the layperson misunderstood a 
definitional element of the crime. A lay concept which 
does sufficiently parallel the legal definition leads to an 
irrelevant mistake under the doctrine of 
Subsumptionsirrtum. •36 
The distinction between Tatbestands- and 
Subsumptionsirrtum may be illustrated by reference to the 
concept of breaking, which constitutes one of the 
elements of the offence of housebreaking with intent to 
commit a crime. Assume that X enters a building by 
pushing open a partially open door with the intent of 
stealing an object inside the building in the mistaken belief 
that the offence of housebreaking is only committed if one 
physically gains access to the premises by, for example, 
picking the lock of a locked door. His/her error in this 
instance would constitute a Tatbestandsirrtum since his/her 
concept of breaking does not sufficiently parallel the legal 
definition thereof. (S/he would of course be guilty of theft 
in such circumstances, but that is not in issue for the 
purposes of this discussion.) Per contrast, X's error would 
constitute a legally irrelevant Subsumptionsirrtum if s/he 
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thought that opening a closed but unlocked door 
constituted housebreaking but that opening a partially 
open door did not, since his/her concept of breaking does 
sufficiently parallel the legal definition thereof. 
It is submitted that the above example illustrates the 
practical utility of the distinction. The classification of a 
particular offence as either housebreaking or theft is of 
extreme relevance to the accused since the former 
ordinarily justifies the imposition of a much heavier 
sentence than the latter. Furthermore, in the case of 
offences in general, the distinction may function to 
determine whether or not the accused is criminally liable. 
(b) VERBOTSIRRTUM 
Jescheck provides the following definition of the German 
concept of Verbotsirrtum: "Der Verbotsirrtum ist der lrrtum 
Ober die Rechtswidrigkeit der Tat. ...Der Tater weiss, was er 
(sic) tut, nimmt aber irrig an, es sei erlaubt. Verbotsirrtum 
ist aber nicht nor die positive Annahme, die Tat sei erlaubt, 
... ouch dos Fehlen einer Vorstel/ung Ober die rechtlicl1e 
Bewertung der Tat."37 The ambit of the German concept 
of Verbotsirrtum is wider than the South African notion of 
error iuris. It encompasses both error iuris in the sense of 
ignorance or mistake of law (direkter Verbotsirrtum) and a 
mistaken belief in the existence or extent of a justification 
ground (indirekter Verbotsirrtum). 
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The Unvermeidbarkeitsdoktrin, which is determinative of the 
legal effect of a Verbotsirrtum, is entrenched in sl 7 of the 
Code. The section reads as follows: "Fehlt dem Tater dos 
Unrechtsbewusstsein, so handelt er (sic) ohne Schuld, wenn 
die Unkenntnis fur ihn unvermeidbar war Cs 1). Konnte der 
Tater den lrrtum vermeiden, so kann die Strafe nach s49 I 
gemildert werden Cs 2).38 Whereas, as was mentioned 
supra, a Tatbestandsirrtum renders the conduct in question 
justified and hence lawful, an Unvermeidbaren 
Verbotsirrtum operates as a Schuldausschliesungsgrund and 
thus precludes the inquiry into culpability, although the 
conduct in question remains unlawful. 
Not every mistaken belief pertaining to a justification 
ground is regarded as an instance of indirekter 
Verbotsirrtum. Jescheck provides a three-tier classification 
of the different kinds of error concerning a justification 
ground and the different legal consequences attaching to 
each: 
(i) Bestandsirrtum: "Der Tater nimmt irrig dos Bestehen 
eines von der Rechtsordnung nicht anerkcnnten 
Rechtfertigungsgrundes an ... ' 
(ii) Grenzirrtum: "(Der Tater) verkennt die rechtlichen 
Grenzen eines anerkannten 
Rechtfertigungsgrundes ... • 
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Both Bestandsirrtum (error concerning the existence of a 
justification ground) and Grenzirrtum (error concerning the 
extent of a justification ground) are regarded as instances 
of indirekter Verbotsirrtum and are thus subject to 
determination in accordance with the 
Unvermeidbarkeitsdoktrin. Fletcher provides the following 
examples of Bestandsirrtum and Grenzirrtum: The former 
occurs, for example, when the actor believes "that as a 
teacher, one is privileged to use corporal punishment as a 
disciplinary measure,· whereas in fact no such justification 
ground exists in the jurisdiction. The latter occurs when, for 
example, the actor believes "that deadly force is 
permissible to stop a petty thief,• whereas in fact only non-
deadly force is permissible in such circumstances.39 
(iii) Erlaubnistatbestandsirrtum: "Der dritte Fall, in dem 
der Tater irrig Omstande fur gegeben halt, die, wenn 
sie vorlagen,_ die Tat rechtfertigen wurden, ... ist ein 
lrrtum eigener Art .. :40 
As was mentioned in Section D.2 supra, the sui generis 
nature of an Erlaubnist6tbestandsirrtum derives from the 
fact that it straddles the categories of T6tbestandsirrtumer 
and indirekter Verbotsirrtumer. Although the new Code 
does not deal with this type of error, the consensus of 
opinion is that. like a Tatbestandsirrtum, it operates to 
exclude intent and hence renders the conduct in question 
justified. As was pointed out in Section D.2 supra, this kind 
of error constituted the raison d etre for the eingeschr6nkte 
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Schuldteorie. An actor labours under an 
Erlaubnistatbestandsirrtum where. for example. s/he kills 
another in the mistaken belief that s/he is being attacked 
by an aggressor. Had his/her mistaken belief been correct 
his/her conduct would have constituted self-defence and 
would thus have been justified. An Erlaubnistatbestands-
irrtum is clearly founded upon a factual error that results in 
an error of law. Fletcher avers that "there is considerable 
authority supporting the same outcome as applied to 
mistakes about the definition:41 
(c) IRRTUM OBER ENTSCHULDIGUNGSGRUNDE 
Errors concerning grounds of excuse. albeit subject to the 
same three-tier system of categorisation as those 
concerning grounds of justification. have different legal 
consequences. Jescheck provides the following exposition 
of the rationale for the differential treatment of the various 
categories: "Der lrrtum Ober dos Bestehen eines 
Entschuldigungsgrundes ist ebenso bedeutunslos wie der 
lrrtum Ober seine Grenzen. da nur der Gesetzgeber daruber 
entscheiden kann. in welchen Fallen mit Rucksicht auf die 
wesentliche Minderung des Unrechts- und Schuldgehalts 
der Tat kein Schuldvorwurf erhoben wird.042 "Der 
unvermeidbare lrrtum Ober die Voraussetzungen eines 
anerkannten Entschuldigungsgrundes entschuldigt der 
Tater. weil er (sic) subjektiv unter den gleichen 
Bedingungen handelt. wie wenn die dem 
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Entschuldigungsgrund entsprechende Lage wirklich 
gegeven gewesen ware."43 
Fletcher provides the following examples of the first two 
types of error relating· to an excuse: the actor believes 
"that the jurisdiction recognizes the excuse of necessity as 
well as of duress" whereas in fact necessity does not 
constitute an excuse in the relevant jurisdiction; the actor 
believes "that the excuse of duress encompasses homicide 
as well as lesser offenses" whereas the jurisdiction does not 
excuse homicide on the grounds of duress.44 He attributes 
the legal irrelevance of these errors to the fact that, on the 
one hand, they "do not negate the actor's choice to 
commit a wrongful act," and that, on the other hand, "the 
range of excuses recognized in a particular system is a 
delicate political issue; if mistakes could expand the range 
of excusing conditions, the courts and legislatures would 
lose control over the scope of acceptable excuses."45 
The third type of error occurs where, for example, the 
actor believes "that unless one commits perjury, one will be 
killed by the defendant in the case."46 Had the belief 
been correct, the conduct in question would have been 
excused. Since "the subjective experience of pressure is 
just.as great, whether the danger is real or imaginary." this 
type of error is not treated as irrelevant but is adjudicated 
in accordance with the Unvermeidbarkeitsdoktrin. "Thus the 
mistake must be unavoidable in order that the actor's 
conduct be assessed as though the threat and the danger 
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were real."47 As was mentioned in Section D.2 supra, the 
legal consequence attaching to this type of error 
exemplifies the operation of the eingeschrankte 
Schuldteorie. 
It is submitted that the intricate categorisation system employed 
in relation to the German law of mistake exemplifies both the 
theoretical precision and the practical utility of the normative 
theory of criminal liability. Furthermore, and most importantly, the 
development of intermediate categories such as 
Erlaubnist6tbestandsirrtum, and the utilisation of the flexible 
criterion of Unvermeidbarkeit (albeit suitably modified as will be 
argued in Section D.4 infra) in the adjudication of Verbatsirrtumer, 




UNVERMEIDBARKEITSDOKTRIN: A CRITIQUE 
To reiterate an oft-mentioned point, Verbotsirrtumer are assessed 
in accordance with the Unvermeidborkeitsdoktrin. A Verbotsirrtum 
exculpates if unavoidable, but merely results in mitigation of 
-
sentence if avoidable. The test for Verbotsirrtumer is thus more 
stringent than that for Totbestandsirrtumer (which exclude intent 
and hence exculpate regardless of their (un)avoidability). The 
difference in effect between the two types of error is justified by 
reference to the following rationale: An actor who has 
knowledge of the contents of the proscription is put on his/her 
guard and is expected to check carefully that his/her proposed 
behaviour is not contrary to law (the so-called Warnfunktion des 
Totbestandsvorsotzes referred to supra.) "From this, it follows that 
the law should set higher standards for excusing a defendant 
acting without consciousness of wrongdoing than a defendant 
acting without knowledge of the factual situation."48 
Although the duality of this approach has been criticised, it is 
submitted that there are good grounds for its existence. Not only 
is the above-mentioned rationale well-founded, it is also 
important for a legal system to achieve a fair balance between 
the needs of the individual and those of the social collectivity. 
One . of the fundamental touchstones of modern social 
democracy is the rule of law. To freely allow individual 
· misperceptions to supercede the dictates of the law (as is the 
case, it is submitted, in South African law) could result in the 
eschewal of the rule of law and hence undermine the needs of. 
38 
the social collectivity. (This point will receive further elaboration in 
Section E.3(b) infra.) 
Upon closer examination, however, the stringency of the 
Unvermeidbarkeitsdoktrin becomes apparent. Not only is it more 
stringent than the test for Tatbestandsirrtumer, it is also more 
... 
stringent than both the test for negligence and the test for ci 
well-founded excuse. The normative test for negligence is 
described as follows by Jescheck: "The unlawfulness of 
negligence consists of violating the duty of due care demanded 
in human relations, and in thus causing an unlawful result, for 
example, the death of a person by negligent homicide. The 
mens rea of negligence, however, lies in the offender not 
adhering to the required standard of care and foresight, 
although he (sic) could to the extent of his (sic) personal 
capacity well have done so. Thus an objective 'reasonable-
man'(sic)-test as well as a subjective 'personal capacity'-test is 
applied in ascertaining negligence in German criminal law. •49 It 
has been argued that the test for Verbotsirrtumer should differ 
from the test for negligence since • ... the blame in error iuris is of a 
different kind. Negligence is culpable failure to use care 
necessary to avoid harm; failure to d6 so is largely a matter of 
intellect and manual skill. The central concept of vincible error, 
on the other hand, is failure to search one's conscience:50 
Arzt is critical of this approach. Although he concedes that "(t)he 
desire to erect simple and efficient floodgates against mistake of 
law defenses may dictate this res~lt, •51 he is of the view that 
the difference in standard between · the test for Verbotsirrtumer 
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and for ordinary negligence is unacceptable. Botha is likewise 
critical of the German approach. He argues that "(d)it is egter 
rrioeilik om in te sien hoe die toets vir die bepaling van 'n 
verwytbare verbodsdwaling iets anders as 'n 
sorgvuldigheidsmaatstaf is, soortgelyk aan die waarmee die 
teenwoordigheid van culpa gebruiklikerwyse vasgestel word ... 11 52 
As was mentioned supra, German law distinguishes between a 
schuldauschliesungsgrund, a ground excluding culpability, and an 
entschu!digungsgrund, a ground of excuse. An unavoidable 
Verbotsirrtum is regarded as a species of the former. While 
Verbotsirrtumer are governed by the Unvermeitbarkeitsdoktrin, 
grounds of excuse are governed by the Unzumutbarkeitsdoktrin 
(the doctrine of reasonable expectability). Since the 
Unzumutbarkeitsdoktrin embodies a test which is both objective 
and subjective and is predicated upon the notion of 
reasonableness, it .. is in effect the same as the test for 
negligence. It follows from what was stated supra that the test 
for an unavoidable mistake of law is higher than the test for a 
well-founded excuse. That the Unzumutbarkeitsdoktrin is not 
applicable to instances of mistake of law is borne out by the 
following remark by Snyman: "Die algemene gevoel onder die 
meeste skryv;ers is dat die leerstuk (van Unzumutbarkeit) te vaag 
en algemeen is om as 'n algemene verweer in die regspraktyk te 
dien. ...(dit) sol lei tot regsonsekerheid en (sol) ... die algemeen 
afskrikkende doe!: van strafoplegging aan bande ... le."53 "Dit 
lee·f voort in die besondere skulduitsluitingsgronde wot in die 
Duitse positiewe reg erk en word, soos skulduitsluitende 
noodtoestand, die oorskryding van noodweer, sekere gevalle 
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van handeling op bevel en die reels met betrekking tot wat van 
iemand verwag word in · n situasie waarin hy (sic) moet kies 
tussen twee botsende pligte."54 
That the test for Verbotsirrtumer embodies a standard that is 
higher than both the test for negligence and the test for a 
ground of excuse should be abundantly clear from the above 
analysis. It is submitted that the difference in standard between 
the tests is not dictated by considerations of theoretical logic or 
precision. Per contrast. it constitutes an illustration of the 
inflection of the law with a conseNative value-judgment. It is 
submitted further that. although this approach may have 
coincided with socio-political reality at an earlier historical 
moment. it has. in the face of the merging of East and West and 
the concomitant heterogenisation of the German community, 
ceased to do so. A stratified community that espouses 
conflicting social and moral values cannot with integrity uphold 
an overly stringent approach to mistake of law. 
It is accordingly submitted that the German doctrine of mistake 
can only successfully be implemented in South Africa provided it 
is shorn of its intractable approach to mistake of law. The test for 
a successful reliance on mistake of law should encompass a 
criterion that is no higher than that embodied in the 
Unzumutbarkeitsdoktrin or in the ordinary test for negligence. 
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E. ENGLISH LAW 
1. THE ENGLISH RULE 
As was mentioned supra, English law adheres in principle to the 
psychological rather than the normative theory of criminal liability. 
Although a strict application of this theory· leads to the equal 
treatment of mistakes of fact and of law, English jurists have 
eschewed theoretical precision in favour of legal policy in relation 
to mistake of law by adopting the maxim ignorantia iuris non 
excusat. English law thus adheres to the psychological theory 
only in relation to mistake of fact. 
The law relating to mistake of fact was clarified as follows in 
Director of Public Prosecutions v Morgan [1976) AC 182, [1975) 2 
All ER 347: 
"Mistake is a defence where it prevents D from having the 
mens rea which the law requires for the crime with which 
he (sic) is charged. Where the law requires intention or 
recklessness with respect to some element in the actus 
reus, a mistake, whether reasonable or not, which 
precludes both states of mind will excuse. Where the law 
requires only negligence, then only a reasonable mistake 
can afford a defence ... Where strict liability is imposed, then 
even a reasonable mistake will not excuse."55 
English and South African law thus adopt the same approach to 
mistake of fact. There are, however, some indications in the 
'..:.'.l 
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recent case-law that the English courts require a mistake of fact 
to be reasonable before it can exculpate. "In doing this, the 
courts appear to be resiling from the position adopted by the 
House of Lords in Morgan where it was held that any mistake 
defeating the required mental element must exculpate as a 
matter of logical necessity, whether it was a reasonable one or 
not."56 
The English rule relating to mistake of law was firmly reiterated by 
Lord Bridge in Grant v Borg (1982) 2 All ER 257 (HlJ at 263: ' ... the 
principle that ignorance of the law is no defence in crime is so 
fundamental that to construe the word 'knowingly' in a criminal 
statute as requiring not merely knowledge of facts material to the 
offender's guilt, but also knowledge of the relevant law, would 
be revolutionary and, to my mind, wholly unacceptable."57 The 
ignorantia iuris non excusat maxim holds "even though it also 
appears that D's ignorance of the law was quite reasonable and 
even, apparently, if it was quite impossible for him (sic) to know 
of the prohibition in question. ...In Bailey, D was convicted of an 
offence created by a statute which was passep while he was on 
the high seas although he committed the act before the end of 
the voyage when he could not possibly have known of the 
statute." The judges did, however, recommend a pardon.58 The 
logical converse of the ignorantia iuris rule is that knowledge of 
unlmvfulness is not regarded as an essential element of criminal 
liability in English law. 
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2. IGNORANTIA IURIS: EXCEPTIONS 
The inflexibility of the ignorantia iuris rule has engendered the 
development, in typically casuistic fashion, of a number of 
exceptions thereto. As has been argued by Smith, • ... the English 
courts have shown themselves ready in appropriate situations to 
manipulate the law and fact distinction, sometimes in such a 
way as to exculpate persons genuinely not at fault in breaking 
the law."59 The exceptions developed by the courts and the 
legislature will briefly be outlined in what follows: 
(a) The legislature has, in section 3(2) of the Statutory 
Instruments Act of 1946, attempted to alleviate the burden 
of the ignorant accused. The section reads as follows: "In 
any proceedings against any person for an offence 
consisting of a contravention of any ... statutory instrument, 
it shall be a defence to prove th9t the instrument had not 
been issued by Her Majesty's Stationary Office at the date 
of the alleged contravention unless it is proved that at that 
date reasonable steps had been taken for the purpose of 
bringing the purport of the instrument to the notice of the 
public, or of persons likely to be affected by it, or of the 
person charged.· Smith has noted that the ambit of the 
section is restricted to situations where the instrument has in 
fact not been publ\shed, and takes the view that " ... the 
section has about it more the air of an improvised post-
war emergency measure than a calculated attempt to 
eradicate potential injustices. 1160 
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Cb) The courts have come to the aid of the ignorant accused 
in certain instances where the law is genuinely unknowable. 
"In LIM CHIN AIK the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council held that an immigrant could not be guilty of a 
breach of an immigration ordinance made in respect of 
him personally where he was unaware of its existence, and 
no steps had been taken to acquaint him of its 
promulgation. •61 
(c) Knowledge of unla\Nfulness is regarded as an element of 
criminal liability in the case of children between the ages 
of 8 and 14 and must be proved by the Crown.62 
(d) Where the Legislature criminalises continuing conduct 
which has hitherto been legal, the accused must be given 
a reasonable opportunity to cease such conduct or to put 
it right.63 
Ce) "Subsumpsiedwaling (die dader is vertroud met die 
wetsbepaling moor meen verkeerdelilk dot sy (sic) 
handeling nie daardeur gedek word nie) word beskou as 
'n 'mistake of mixed law and fact' en verskoon oor die 
algemeen."64 
(f) It was held in Barrett and Barrett (1980) 72 Cr App Rep 212 
(CA) at 216 that " ... an honest belief in a certain state of 
things does afford a defence, including an honest though 
mistaken · belief about legal rights. •65 As has been 
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mentioned by Smith and Hogan, however, the principle 
enunciated in Barrett only applies where the definition of 
the actus reus contains a legal concept such as 'property 
belonging to another', and is "probably also confined to 
the case where the legal concept belongs to the civil 
law ... "66 
(g) The ignorantia iuris maxim does not apply in the case of a 
so-called 'claim of right'. Smith and Hogan explain the 
operation of this exception as follows: • ... if D believed he 
(sic) had a right to do the act in question, he (sic) had no 
mens rea and therefore was not guilty of the crime. This 
defence will prevail even if D's belief is mistaken and is 
based upon an entirely \Nrong view of the law. It is 
available in a number of important crimes, including theft 
(and) criminal damage to property .. ."67 
Ch) Certain criminal statutes have curtailed the operation of 
the ignorantia iuris maxim. The. definition of blackmail in 
the Theft Act constitutes an example of this legislative 
trend. "The offence is only committed if the 'demand' is 
'unwarranted', and it is not unwarranted if D believes that 
'the use of menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the 
demand. ·•68 
Ci) Since foreign law is regarded as fact by the English courts, 
mistakes of foreign law are treated as mistakes of fact and 
are thus excusable.69 
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It should be apparent from the foregoing that the multifarious 
exceptions to the ignorantia iuris rule have severely circumscribed 
its sphere of operation. In the light of the many criticisms of the 
rule (on which see section E.3. infra) and of its restricted field of 
application, it would clearly have been apposite for the English 
Law Commission to advocate its abolition. The Commission 
refused to do so, however, since there is no authority in English 
law in favour of a defence of mistake of law. It therefore chose 
to adhere to the orthodox position. 70 
47 
3. IGNORANTIA IURIS: A CRITIQUE 
As was argued in Section D.4 supra, it is necessary, in order to 
uphold the value of social responsibility and to prevent the 
eschewal of the rule of law, to treat Verbotsirrtumer more 
stringently than Tatbestandsirrtumer. if was argued further, 
however, that the criterion employed to distinguish between 
exculpatory and non-exculpatory Verbotsirrtumer should ensure 
that these values are balanced against the value of individual 
liberty. The maintenance of such a balance will, it is submitted, 
facilitate the achievement of social justice. It will be argued in 
what follows that this balance can be achieved by the utilisation 
of the flexible criterion of reasonableness rather than by the 
deployment of the maxim ignorantia iuris non excusat. The 
rigidity of the maxim has engendered numerous exceptions and 
has thereby caused the law to be unnecessarily complex and 
uncertain. Moreover, the_ arguments that purport to justify the 
retention of the maxim tend, it is submitted, to weight the scales 
unduly against the value of individual liberty. The tvvo major 
philosophical rationales that favour the existence of the maxim, • 
viz the argument from utilitarianism and the argument from 
legality, constitute the primary focus of the following analysis. 
(a) The argument from utilitarianism 
Oliver Wendall Holmes, the most renowned exponent of 
the utilitarian philosophy, formulates his argument in the 
following terms: "Public policy sacrifices the individual to 
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the general good ... lt is no doubt true that there are many 
cases in which the criminal could not have known that he 
(sic) was breaking the law, but to admit the excuse at all 
would be to encourage ignorance ... and justice to the 
individual is rightly outweighed by the larger interests on the 
other side of the scales.· 71 The utilitarian argument, albeit 
rightly concerned to emphasise the importance of the 
interests of the social coilectivity, accords insufficient 
weight to the interests of the individual and hence fails to 
achieve the balance that, it has been submitted, is 
necessary to ensure the attainment of social justice. 
(b) The argument from legality 
Hall has argued that "if the law were to assess a 
defendant's culpability on the footing of the law as he 
(sic) believed it to be, then for those purposes the law 
would be thus and so. This could undercut the rule of law, 
which relies on an objective law impartially administered by 
officials who declare what the law is." Fletcher has 
attempted to refute this argument by averring that it fails 
"to distinguish between wrongdoing and attribution, 
justification and excuse. The mere fact that an individual is 
not held to be legally accountable for a wrong act does 
not mean that the act is not condemned; it means only 
that the actor is not to be blamed for what he (sic) did. 
Excusing a particular violation does not alter the legal 
prohibition. Recognizing mistake of law as an excuse does 
not change the law; if the excused mistaken party were 
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to leave the courthouse and commit the violation again, 
he (sic) would clearly be guilty.· 72 
Smith takes issue with Fletcher's refutation of Hall's 
argument. He acknowledges the theoretical plausibility of 
Fletcher's statement that an excuse does not modify the 
law but argues that in practice the effect of such an 
excuse is indeed to change the relevant legal rule, since, 
in the absence of a profound and widely-publicised 
alteration of the legal status quo, the average lay-person 
is unlikely to appreciate the difference between grounds of 
justification and grounds of excuse.73 
It is submitted that Hall's concern to uphold the rule of law 
is justified since its retention is necessary to avoid the 
creation of social anarchy. It is submitted further, however, 
that to overemphasise the omnipotence of the rule of law 
is to lapse into an authoritarian argument that undermines 
the importance of individual liberty and hence fails to 
achieve the balance between competing interests that 
the ideal of social justice demands. 
It should be apparent from the foregoing that the two major 
arguments that purport to favour the ignorontio iuris maxim fail to 
achieve the ideal of socio/. justice in the realm of the 
philosophical abstraction. It must be conceded, however, that 
the cumulative effect of the rule and its exceptions is to achieve 
social Justice in most practical instances, albeit only in relation to 
the adjudication of core cases. . This assertion may be illustrated 
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by reference to the English defence of a 'claim of right'. (This 
defence was discussed in Section E.2(g) supra.) Assume that X 
sells Y's property in the mistaken belief that s/he had a right to 
do so since Y had sold it to him/her. In fact, and unbeknown to 
X, the property is still owned by Y in terms of a reseNation of 
ownership clause in a hire-purchase agreement. In terms of 
English law X can successfully raise the defence of a 'claim of 
right' if charged with the offence of theft. It is submitted that an 
application of the German approach to the above factual 
scenario would yield the same result. X's error would be classified 
as a Tatbestandsirrtum since s/he has misconstrued one of the 
elements of the Tatbestand viz the intention to appropriate the 
property of another. The effect of the English approach to the 
solution of core cases is thus largely the same as the German. 
It is submitted, however, that the adjudication of penumbra! 
cases is rendered problematic by the rigidity of the English 
approach. The steadfast refusal on the part of the English courts 
to exculpate in instances of recsonable reliance on erroneous 
legal advice and in cases of mistakes pertaining to grounds of 
justification exemplifies the above assertion. It will appear from a 
consideration of the discussion in Section G infra that the 
German approach is adequately equipped to deal with such 
issues. 
It has been argued that the English approach, albeit insufficiently 
equipped to ensure the attainment of social justice in the realm 
of philosophy, is nonetheless capable of realising this ideal in 
practice, at least in the solution of core cases. It thus effectively 
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approximates the German approach in this regard. It remains, 
however, to consider which of the two jurisdictions employs the 
most advantageous method of achieving this result. 
F. 
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METHODOLOGY: GERMAN V ENGLISH LAW 
It may be said that the German and the English legal systems are 
premised upon paradigmatic opposites. The difference in method 
between the two jurisdictions is aptly summarised by Snyman: 
" ... Germans tend to reason deductively, whereas the English are 
traditionally sceptical of reasoning from the general to the particular 
and prefer the more inductive method of reaching a conclusion by 
reasoning by analogy ... The English prefer ... to confine the result of an 
inquiry to the particular context, in other words, facts, of a case. ■74 
Whereas Germen jurists are concerned with theoretical precision and 
logical deduction, English lawyers often become ensconced in a 
plethora of casuistic extensions, exceptions and variations. Matthews 
adverts to the disadvantages of the English method in relation to error 
iuris. He argues that "(a) particularly difficult problem of moral 
blameworthiness arises in any case where the law is uncertain. How 
can D be morally liable for an act if even the lawyers and judges do 
not know at that stage if such an act is legally right or wrong?" He 
proceeds to illustrate " ... some of the dangers of convicting the morally 
innocent. First, it invites contempt for the law, as being unrealistic and 
out of touch. Second, as a result of the first, it must lessen the status of 
'convict' for more serious crimes. Third, ... a defendant is tarred with a 
conviction which may affect his (sic) present status in the community, 
or his (sic) future prospects .. ."75 
It is submitted, along with Snyman, that • ... the German approach is 
preferable. Because of consistency of principle it is more conducive to 
legal certainty than the English model. The law becomes more 
predictable since one is dealing with a system of general rules or 
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concepts capable of systematic analysis .. ." 7 6 Furthermore, the 
theoretical precision of the German approach, as exemplified in the 
development of categories of mistake that facilitate the solution of 
both core and penumbra! cases (vide Section D.3 supra), is conducive 
to legal simplicity and hence enhances the accessibility of the law (an 
important consideration in a heterogeneous and underdeveloped 
society such as South Africa). Moreover, the flexibility ·of the criterion 
employed to distinguish between exculpatory and non-exculpatory 
Verbotsirrtumer (suitably modified to approximate the standard of 
reasonableness. as was argued supra) ensures that_ the conflicting 
values which inevitably exist in a heterogeneous society are recognised 
and given effect to in appropriate cases. As has been argued by 
Fletcher, "(t)he tight moral consensus that once supported the criminal 
law has obviously disappeared. This has happened as a result both of 
the vast expcnsion of the criminal law into regulatory offenses and the 
disintegration of the Judea-Christian moral consensus. In a pluralistic 
society, saddled with criminal sanctions affecting every area of life, one 
cannot expect that everyone know what is criminal and what is not."77 
G. 
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ADVANTAGES OF GERMAN LAW 
It was argued in the preceding section that, although the German and 
English law of mistake ordinarily yield the same result in the adjudication 
of core cases, the methodology utilised by the former is preferable to 
the casuistic approach of the latter. It has, furthermore, been asserted 
throughout this paper that the normative approach, as applied in 
German law, is theoretically superior to the psychological approach 
adhered to in South African law, and that its implementation in 
practice may in certain circumstances affect the outcome of the 
decision. This latter submission will be substantiated in what follows with 
reference to the German approach to errors concerning grounds of 
justification and to the problem of reliance on erroneous legal advice. 
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1. MISTAKEN BELIEF CONCERNING JUSTIFICATION GROUND 
The legal effect of an error relating to a ground of justification in 
the post-de Blom era is expounded as follows by De Wet and 
Swanepoel: " ... die persoon wot ten onregte meen dot sy (sic) 
handeling geregverdig is of wot die perke wot regtens geoorloof 
is oorskry, (hand el) wel wederregtelik ... , moor ... nie do!o malo 
... nie, omdat wederregtelikheidsbewussyn ontbreek. Dit geld ook 
van die persoon wot te goeie trou die perke van 'n 
regverdigingsgrond oorskry. Aon die ander kant handel 'n 
persoon we! opsetlik as hy (sic) weet dot hy (sic) die perke van 
·n regverdigingsgrond oorskry, en is hy (sic) aanspreeklik vir sy 
(sic) do/us, cihoewel hy (sic) miskien tegemoetkomend gestraf 
kan word, omdat hy (sic) in die opwinding van die oomblik 
gehandel het."78 In South African law, therefore, an error 
concerning a ground of justification, if bona fide, negates intent 
and hence excludes criminal liability regardless of its 
(un)reasonableness. It may, however, result in the imposition of 
liability in the case of crimes requiring negligence if it is 
unreasonable. Tne German distinction between Bestands- and 
Grenzirrtumer, on the one hand, which exclude Schuld only if 
unavoidable, and Ertaubnist6tbestandsirrtumer, on the other, 
which exclude intent regardless of their (un)reasonableness, is not 
made in South African law. This unduly liberal approach has 
resulted in a number of problematic judgments. 
In S v Barnard (1) 1985 (4) SA 431 (W) the accused, two 
policemen, were charged with the murder of two alleged 
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housebreakers. They sought to rely on the statutory justification 
ground of justifiable homicide which is incorporated in s49(2) of 
the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. The court, per Coetzee 
J, held that the accused had failed to comply with the 
requirements of the subsection since the flight of the deceased 
could have been prevented by other means. The issue before 
the court was thus whether the accused had bona fide believed 
that their conduct fell within the subsection, ie whether or not 
they had acted with knowledge of unlawfulness. 
"Both assessors were satisfied that the accused had been aware 
of the \NTOngfu!ness of their actions. Coetzee J, on the other 
hand, felt that it could reasonably possibly be true that the 
accused had committed a gross error of judgment and, 
therefore, lacked knowledge of \NTOngfulness."79 The 
consequence of such a finding in terms of the psychological 
approach, viz an acquittal, was clearly at odds with the le9rned 
judge's sense of justice. He therefore attempted to apply the 
· normative approach in the guise of the psychological approach 
in order to secure a conviction. 
Since the ratio constitutes anything but a logical exposition of the 
law, it is worth quoting in toto. The learned judge reasoned as 
follows: 
"Ek meen dis juridies onsuiwer om 
wederregtelikheidsbewussyn in 'n geval wat ender art 49 
ressorteer te beperk tot bloot simplistiese daadwerklike 
kennis van die verbode aard van die daad. Dit is 'n 
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unieke geval. Die dader moet self daar en don objektief 
die redelikheid van sy (sic) optrede beoordeel, wot ex post 
facto op dieselfde objektiewe basis gekontroleer staan te 
word. DaaNan hang die wederregtelikheid van die daad 
af. As hierdie objektiewe element noodwendig moet 
bestaan op die oomblik wanneer die daad gepleeg word, 
wot ook die oomblik is wanneer sy (sic) bewussyn van die 
aard daaNan relevant is. skyn dit vir my hoegenaamd nie 
onlogies dot daardie selfde element nie buite rekening 
gelaat kan word wanneer die inhoud van die begrip, 
wederregte!ikheidsbewussyn, in hierdie bepaalde geval 
betrag word nie. Dit beteken don nie net daadwerklike 
kennis, subjektief gesproke. nie. Dit ken ook so gestel 
word. Die dader wot besluit om opsetlik te dood weet dot 
dit wederregtelik is, tensy hy (sic), objektief gesproke. 
tevrede is dot daar nie 'n ander redelike uitweg is nie. As 
hierdie objektiewe basis nie bestaan nie. don bly die 
aanvanklike bewussyn van die wederregtelikheid 
voortbestaan as die vereiste element. selfs in die 
psigologiese skuldbegrip. 
Moontlik sol hierdie resultaat deur sommige beskou word as 
'n geringe :nenting van die normatiewe begrip in hierdie 
bepaalde gevc!. vir regspolities rede, op die aanvaarde 
psigologiese skuidbegrip. Ek glo egter nie dot dit prakties 
enige soak mack nie. Ek meen dot dit nodig is· om wot 
andersins 'n onbevredigende juridiese prent is, helderder in 
te kleur. 
Myns insiens dus in casu. maak dit nie soak of. soos deur 
die assessore bevind is, daar die daadwerklike 
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wederregtelikheidsbewussyn ... aanwesig was of nie. Door 
was nogtans ... wederregtelikheidsbewussyn in juridiese sin, 
as die beskuldigde objektief die situasie verkeerd 
beoordeel het."(438C-H) 
In S v Ne/ 1980 (4) SA 28 (ELD) the appellants, also two 
policemen, were charged with attempted murder in that they 
had shot at two persons who had failed to stop at a road block. 
Counsel for the appellants contended that • ... by travelling though 
the so-called 'road block' in the way they did the complainants 
committed an offence in the presence of the appellants and 
that the appe!lants were therefore entitled to arrest them,• in 
accordance with the provisions of s40 Cl) (a) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977.(33D-E) The court, per Eksteen J, 
rejected this contention since the road block had not been a 
proper road block. The alternative contention, which was 
founded upon s40 (1) Cb), was also rejected by the court since 
the requisite 'reasonable suspicion' was lacking. The appellants 
sought further to rely on the statutory justification ground 
embodied in s49 and argued that they had bona fide believed 
that their conduct fell within the provisions of the section. ·on 
the facts the appeal court found the belief so unreasonable, 
'more particularly when applied to trained policemen', that the 
court could not believe it to have been held in good faith. •80 
Snyman has argued that an analysis of the case causes one to 
wonder whether the courts, 'in gevalle waar die aanwending van 
'n suiwere subjektiewe toets by 'n verweer van regsonkunde tot 
onbillike resultate sou lei, nie tog moor terugval op 'n objektiewe 
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redelikheidstoets nie - al se hulle dit nie uitdruklik nie. Die indruk 
wat 'n mens uit die Ne/-beslissing kry, is dat die hof 'n bevinding 
van wederregtelikheidsbewussyn gemaak het eenvoudig op 
grond van die onredelikheid van die beskuldigde se dwaling. 11 81 
It is submitted that an application of the German three-tier 
clqssification of errors relating to justification grounds yields the 
conclusion that the errors in both Barnard and Ne/ constitute 
Grenzirrtumer. In Barnard the accused had exceeded the 
bounds of the statutory justification ground of justifiable homicide 
by shooting without first resorting to other methods of preventing 
the accused from fleeing. They had, however, acted in the 
belief that they had complied with all the requirements of the 
section. In Net, per contrast, the appellants had exceeded the 
bounds of justifiable homicide since they had acted without 
entertaining a reasonable suspicion that the complainants had 
committed a Schedu!e 1 offence. They alleged, however, that 
they had erroneously but honestly believed that· they had . 
complied with the requirements of the section. (It is interesting to 
note that, had the appellants' evidence that they had believed 
the road block to be a proper road block been accepted by 
the court, their error would have been classified as an 
Erloubnistatbestondsirrtum by a German court and would thus 
have negated intent.) 
The submission that the above errors constitute a species of 
Grenzirrtum is supported, inter o/io, by Van der Merwe.82 In 
terms of German law, therefore, the issue of their 
(non)exculpatory effect would have been determined in 
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accordance with the Unvermeidborkeitsdoktrin. It is submitted 
that a German court would have found that in both instances 
the errors were avoidable and hence would only operate in 
mitigation of sentence. An application of the normative 
approach would thus yield the same result as was reached in 
Barnard and Ne/. It would enable our courts to decide 
penumbra! cases in accordance with their sense of justice 
without having to manipulate existing legal principles (as in 
Barnard) or to resort to the law of evidence (as in Ne{). It is in this 
way that the Unvermeidborkeitsdoktrin, suitably modified to 
approximate the criterion of reasonableness, can be utilised to 
impose criminal liability in instances of abuse of power on the 
part of state officials, such as the police, who are statutorily 
imbued with wide discretionary freedom. 
' ' :. 
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2. THE PROBLEM OF LEGAL ADVICE 
Since the decision in De Blom it has become settled law that 
reliance on erroneous legal advice negates knowledge of 
unlawfulness in crimes requiring . intention regardless of the 
(un)reasonableness of such reliance.- : In relation to crimes 
requiring negligence, however, it was held in Oe Blom "that a 
person who works in a particular sphere of activity ought to know 
the law relating to that activity."83 Reliance on erroneous legal 
advice in the case of negligence crimes is therefore subject to 
the criterion of reasonableness. 
The nature of the conduct in respect of which legal advice may 
be followed was outlined cs follows in S v Borkeffs Transport (Pty) 
Ltd 1986 (1) SA 706 (CJ: The legal advice "should relate to a 
single transaction or act about to be entered into or about to be 
carried out and not to a course of conduct extending over a 
considerable time in the future.' The dynamism of the law, the 
court held, necessitates such a delineation of the conduct in 
question since "legal advice obtained today as to a particular 
state of affairs may tomorrow no longer be pertinent." (712H-
713A) 
In S v Woglines (Pty) Ltd 1986 (4) SA 1135 (N) the standard of 
reasonableness in relation to · crimes requiring negligence was 
considered and clarified. The court, per Didcott J,. argued as 
follows: 
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"The reasonable man (sic), your man (sic) of average 
intelligence and sophistication, the one whose fair share of 
worldly experience has taugl1t him (sic) a thing or two, 
knows after all that questions of law lend themselves 
frequently to no single, definite and precise answer. He 
(sic) knows that la\/J\f ers differ time and again in the 
opinions they express on the selfsame issues .. .Does it make 
much sense then to suppose that he (sic) will take for 
granted the correctness of all the legal advice he (sic) 
happens to receive, that doubts or qualms about any he 
(sic) gets will never enter his (sic) mind?" ( 1146D-G) 
Having thus inflected the standard of reasonableness with a high 
level of stringency, the learned judge proceeded to qualify it as 
follows: "The reasonable man (sic) I have sketched has 
perceptions too keen to be shared and standards too high to be 
met by somebody from a humble walk of life who is not 
comparable with him (sic) in either sophistication or 
experience."(11461) 
The approach taken by Didcott J in Waglines has recently been 
subject to criticism in S v C!aosens 1992 (2) 5.A.CR 434 (T). The 
court, per Van Dijkhorst J, expressed its disapproval in the 
following terms: 
"Ek kan met eerbied nie akkoord goon met die 
gedagterigting in S v Woglines (Pty) Ltd and Another ... dot 
regslui en ook Regters van mekaar verskil oor die reg, dot 
in die regsberoep geld quot homines tot sententioe en dot 
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die klient dus nie alle regsadvies wot hy (sic) ontvang as 
korrek kan aanvaar nie. Dit goon myns insiens te ver en 
stel die arme klient gelyk aan ·n hipochondris wot van 
dokter no kwaksalwer no geloofsgeneser swerf en nooit rus 
of genesing vind nie."(440c) 
It is submitted, with respect, that the learned judge in Claasens, 
by failing to consider the dictum by Didcott J at 11461, in effect 
misinterpreted the crux of his argument. (In any event. the 
decision in Claasens, being a judgment of the Transvaal 
Provincial Division, is, like Waglines, not authoritative but merely 
persuasive.) It is submitted that the cumulative effect of the 
above-quoted excerpts from tr:e decision in Wag!ines constitutes 
a subjectivisation of the requirement of reasonableness in the 
sense that it is seen as being cnchored in the socio-political and 
cultural matrix of relations that influences the conduct of the 
accused in the particular circumstances of the case. 
Arzt has argued that " .. .reliance on reasonable though erroneous 
information is the prime example in German case law of 
invincible error iuris."84 He then adverts to the tension that exists 
in the case-law between tr.e need to take cognisance of the 
fact that legal advice can be purchased and the need to 
protect honest citizens who seek honest advice. He is critical of 
the courts' tendency to " ... decide the case at hand on some 
other ground, so as to avoid the· touchy issue of distinguishing 
crooked lawyers from reliable ones giving honest advice."85 
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It is submitted that this tension may be eased in practice by the 
utilisation of expert witnesses at the stage prior to conviction to 
adduce evidence concerning the level of legal knowledge and 
general education in a given community. As was stated at the 
outset of this paper, such witnesses could include persons who 
are either long-standing members or active participants in the 
socio-cultural life of the community in question. It is important to 
note, however, that, since the normative concept of 
reasonableness embodies both objective and subjective 
components, the use of expert evidence will only assist the 
presiding officer in the determination of the objective criteria. A 
' 
· consideration of the subjective circumstances of the accused is 
therefore also necessary in order to ensure the attainment of 
social justice in a particular case. The ultimate determination of 
the issue by the presiding officer should thus be premised upon a 
consideration of both such objective and subjective criteria. 
It is submitted that, provided that the dilemma adverted to by 
'•·. 
Arzt is alleviated, -and ,provided that the Unvermeidborkeitsdoktrin 
is modified to approximate the criterion of reasonableness, the 
normative approach to the issue of legal advice may profitably 
be implemented in South Africa. Its implementation would entail 
the consequence that the above dictum by Didcott J in 
Waglines would, rightly it is submitted, be applicable not only to 
crimes requiring negligence, but also to crimes requiring intention. 
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H. CONCLUSION 
The theoretical and methodological superiority of the German 
approach to the doctrine of mistake has. it is submitted. been amply 
documented in the present paper. Its practical utility has been 
illustrated with reference to the issue of official abuse of power and the 
problem of reliance on erroneous legal advice. Its stringency in relation 
to the former operates to seNe the needs of the social collectivity by 
curtailing such abuse. while its flexibility in relation to the latter facilitates 
the recognition of individual liberties in a heterogeneous society. It 
should. therefore. be apparent that the normative doctrine of mistake. 
suitably modified to incorporate the criterion of reasonableness rather 
than the criterion of unavoidability. ccn. with the aid of the law of 
evidence. be utilised to achieve socio! justice in the adjudication of 
penumbra! cases. It is accordingly submitted that the present discord 
between legal theory and socio-cultural reality will be alleviated by the 
reception of the normative approach in South Africa. 
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